Integrated Country Strategy Somalia FOR PUBLIC RELEASE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Table of Contents 1. Chief of Mission Priorities ................................................................................................................ 2 2. Mission Strategic Framework .......................................................................................................... 5 3. Mission Goals and Objectives .......................................................................................................... 6 4. Management Objectives .................................................................................................................. 9 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Approved: September 14, 2018 1 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 1. Chief of Mission Priorities Somalia’s fragility remains a significant but manageable challenge for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), Federal Members States (FMSs), and international partners. This is following notable achievements through the combined efforts of the FGS and its partner FMSs, with considerable international investment, to promote stability and economic recovery over the past year. International partners remain fully cognizant that the progress achieved over the course of the last six years could be short lived if Somali political elites are unable to advance critical political reconciliation processes to prevent violent conflict, if there is a resurgence of al- Shabaab, or if ISIS begins to gain increased influence; however, the current trends provide cautious optimism for Somalia’s recovery. Major challenges will include destabilizing political disputes as incumbent FMS presidents contend to maintain power in the lead up to FMS elections over the next two years, a highly divided parliament, and continued meddling by foreign governments. During the next three to five years, Somalia’s political leaders and international partners, including the Somali diaspora, must continue to focus collective efforts on promoting good governance, reducing corruption, and assisting the FGS and FMSs to own the responsibility of building effective and accountable security forces. The tools at our disposal include the foreign assistance architecture based on the Somalia National Development Plan, the National Security Architecture, and key agreements forged during National Security Council meetings on the electoral model, constitutional review process, and resource sharing. Additionally, U.S. assistance projects must target building the capacity of multiple levels of government to deliver public services and reinforce the relevance and importance of long-absent government institutions in the daily lives of Somali citizens through the provision of rule of law, security, economic growth, and social development. Al-Shabaab remains a formidable threat, continuing to demonstrate the ability to launch deadly strikes against “soft targets” and innocent civilians across Somalia and beyond its borders. We also must contend with the increasing presence of ISIS. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) security transition plan launched in December 2017 must be operationalized through the combined planning and efforts of the Somali National Army (SNA) and AMISOM with international assistance and planning. Only then can international partners effectively support the liberation of areas under al-Shabaab control in southern Somalia and begin to degrade the influence of ISIS in northern Somalia. The FGS and FMSs must also commit to implementing and operationalizing the National Security Architecture to create command and control procedures for national and regional security forces and police that are capable of holding territory and promoting the rule of law in areas that have been recovered from al- Shabaab and ISIS. Engaging an active and effective Somali private sector in the fight against al-Shabaab is essential. As prominent Somali enterprises begin to choose supporting governance and the provision of security, al-Shabaab’s ability to influence the Somali population, particularly clans, FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Approved: September 14, 2018 2 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE through economic means will begin to wane. The creation of mechanisms to prevent terrorist financing, whether to al-Shabaab or to any successor organization, also remains essential. Even if the FGS and international partners are successful in degrading al-Shabaab and ISIS, destabilizing conflicts among Somali clans and sub-clans will likely continue until political reconciliation processes are implemented. Somalia requires democratic institutions, appropriate dispute settling mechanisms to reconcile long standing differences, and an effective law enforcement and justice system to allow citizens to resolve disputes peacefully and build trust amongst the Somali people. Assisting in the development of the rule of law in Somalia will require a sustained, long-term approach, with international donor and other partners coordinating efforts. Somalia’s economic recovery and resumption of growth after decades of misrule and conflict will promote both national and regional stability. One of the most difficult elements in establishing functional federalism involves determining how the states, local districts, and the federal government will share revenue and implement their chosen model. Progress towards establishing a regulatory framework for the management of natural resources, particularly petroleum and fisheries, continues and remains an important first step in the development of those industries. The international community will need to encourage development of proper relationships and sharing of revenue, including through the provision of advice and technical assistance. In addition, Somalia must reduce its energy costs, which can be up to six times higher than in neighboring Kenya. Somalia needs a well-regulated commercial banking system. The investment climate needs improvement to enable businesses to develop, with monopolies prohibited, land tenure secured, and contract obligations protected. With international partners, we will work to increase and diversify crop and livestock production, the mainstay of the Somali economy, and to expand opportunities for youth employment. The international community will also need to assist with returning refugee populations, as they present special challenges. Humanitarian crises will continue to present major challenges by displacing large numbers of the population and hindering development throughout Somalia. International partners will need to continue providing significant amounts of humanitarian assistance, but at the same time, increase investment in resiliency building measures to begin to reverse the effects of human-made disasters. Somalia suffers from the lowest health and socio-economic indicators in the world. To reverse this situation, we will assist the Somali government to increase its capacity to carry out its core functions and deliver basic services. Increased revenue collection would provide some of the necessary resources, but partners will need to contribute as well, particularly in the education and health sectors, rehabilitating schools and clinics, training teachers and health workers, and helping to develop simple regulatory frameworks. Long-term stability will require establishment of inclusive, representative, and accountable governance. Somalia’s political leadership has considerable work to do to meet its own FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Approved: September 14, 2018 3 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE timetable and goals for revising and ratifying a permanent constitution and preparing for a universal suffrage national election in 2021. Corruption remains endemic in Somalia, requiring radical reforms in public financial institutions to correct the situation. The establishment of an open bidding process and an independent tendering board would serve as essential building blocks to promote financial disclosure, transparent contracting, and parliamentary oversight of expenditures. The security sector requires special attention in improving accountability and transparency. We will continue to work with partners to build capacity at the Central Bank and to reform and standardize the Somali civil service. FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Approved: September 14, 2018 4 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 2. Mission Strategic Framework Mission Goal 1: A Robust, Permanent U.S. Mission Presence in Mogadishu to enable U.S. Policy Leadership Engagement with Somalis Mission Objective 1.1: Enhance management and consular support and cooperation Mission Objective 1.2: Build U.S. public diplomacy penetration and effectiveness in Somalia Mission Goal 2: Overcome Violent Opposition to the State Mission Objective 2.1: Enhance and strengthen the capacity of Somali security institutions to prevent and respond to crime and terrorism Mission Objective 2.2: Help the state degrade and disrupt al-Shabaab and ISIS and maintain and extend state authority Mission Objective 2.3: Improve Somali-led reconciliation and reintegration efforts Mission Goal 3: Build Durable Foundations for a More Stable, Democratic, and Prosperous Somalia Mission Objective 3.1: Support the consolidation of inclusive, accountable, equitable, and responsive governance at the federal, regional, and local level (CDCS TO 1) Mission Goal 4: Expand Inclusive Economic Growth and Improve Service Delivery Mission Objective 4.1: Increase access and quality of basic social services (CDCS TO 2) Mission Objective 4.2: Strengthen enabling economic environment (CDCS TO 3) Management Objective 1: Frequent and flexible travel throughout the city of Mogadishu and to provincial Somali cities Management Objective 2: Add additional management staff to Mission Somalia to support operations, begin assignment of permanent U.S. personnel to Mogadishu, and begin hiring of LE staff in Mogadishu Management Objective 3: Begin constructing a more robust facility (the Somalia Interim Facility) FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Approved: September 14, 2018 5 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 3. Mission Goals and Objectives Mission Goal 1 A Robust, Permanent U.S. Mission Presence in Mogadishu to enable U.S. Policy Leadership Engagement with Somalis Description and Linkages: Our ability to safely maintain an appropriate diplomatic presence on the ground, both in Mogadishu and elsewhere across Somalia, is paramount to the work and success of Mission Somalia. Since 2016, the Mission has worked to expand and regularize our diplomatic presence in Mogadishu to allow us to engage more regularly with Somali officials. To meet U.S. national security objectives, we need reliable transportation, and additional staff both in Nairobi and Mogadishu. With the right platform, the right freedom of movement and risk management, and the right resources, we can more effectively and efficiently advance U.S. policy objectives in Somalia in the coming years. Mission Objective 1.1 Enhance Management and Consular Support and Cooperation. Justification: To meet U.S. national security objectives, most effectively carry out our work, and travel effectively into Mogadishu and around Somalia, we need appropriate and sufficient facilities and life support and require additional positions throughout the Mission. Mission Objective 1.2 Build U.S. Public Diplomacy penetration and effectiveness in Somalia. Justification: In order to advance U.S. influence in Somalia and among its diaspora communities, the Mission needs to be able to constructively engage the people of Somalia through traditional public diplomacy platforms, and through traditional and social media. Messaging will result in positive perceptions of the United States, counter extremist messaging, and highlight efforts of the Somali government in order to build confidence in the FGS. Mission Goal 2 Overcome Violent Opposition to the State Description and Linkages: Somalia’s progress toward becoming a stable, democratic, and prosperous state remains uniquely threatened by al-Shabaab and ISIS. In line with U.S. National Security Strategy, U.S. support to AMISOM and Somali security forces is critical to create the space necessary for Somalia’s political, economic, and development efforts to succeed. Through our support to Somalia’s security sector, we expect the FGS to gradually increase its own capacity and capabilities to fight al-Shabaab and ISIS and ensure peace and stability for the Somali people. FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Approved: September 14, 2018 6 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Mission Objective 2.1 Enhance and strengthen the capacity of Somali security institutions to prevent and respond to crime and terrorism. Justification: President Farmaajo’s administration has prioritized security sector reform and taken several initial steps in line with commitments made as part of the National Security Architecture. The Mission is using the transition to re-energize engagement around how U.S. security assistance can be better leveraged to ensure that Somali security institutions are capable, acceptable, affordable, and accountable. Mission Objective 2.2 Help the state degrade and disrupt al-Shabaab and maintain and extend state authority. Justification: The Mission, with international partners, will assist the FGS and FMSs better establish state authority in key population centers in Somalia. Mission Objective 2.3 Improve Somali-led reconciliation efforts. Justification: The Mission intends to gain a deeper understanding of grievances that have allowed al-Shabaab to endure in parts of Somalia and leverage U.S. security and developmental assistance to help create mechanisms to address these grievances. Mission Goal 3 Build Durable Foundations for a More Stable, Democratic, and Prosperous Somalia Description and Linkages: In line with the U.S. National Security Strategy, the Mission will support the FGS, emerging FMS administrations and existing and newly formed local governments to strengthen state-society relations, promote inclusive decision-making processes over public goods and investments, and establish accountable governance structures. Mission support for these efforts will be key as the FGS and FMSs manage elections, determine a federal electoral model and, and review the constitution. Mission Objective 3.1 Support the consolidation of inclusive, accountable, equitable, and responsive governance at the federal, regional, and local level (CDCS TO 1) Justification: In the 2018-2020 time frame, Somalia must manage multiple governance and political processes that will determine the legitimacy of the state and set the stage for citizen- government interaction in the approach to expected one-person one-vote elections in 2021. FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Approved: September 14, 2018 7 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Mission Goal 4 Expand Inclusive Economic Growth and Improve Service Delivery Description and Linkages: The Mission intends to support the FGS and FMSs in developing the resource and technical capacity to provide basic services, which should increase civic trust in government institutions, improve livelihoods, and address humanitarian needs. In order to boost Somalia’s private sector and help its entrepreneurs gain access to global markets, the Mission intends to provide assistance to eliminate barriers to trade and to ensure that policy and regulation permit expanded business opportunities in Somalia. Mission Objective 4.1 Increase access and quality of basic social services. (CDCS TO 2) Justification: Violent conflict and the disintegration of government in Somalia destroyed core institutions that provided basic services to citizens, including the destruction and damage of schools and universities and the closure of education facilities for long periods of time, particularly in the south and central parts of the country. Within the last two years, the FGS has made important strides in committing to key education priorities through the National Development Plan (NDP) process. However, the education system remains fragmented across states and regions; structures are nascent; education planning is inadequate; and the provision of services is under-resourced and inefficient. With 30.8% of the population of Somalia falling within the age bracket of 5-14 years, Somalia has over 3.7 million children who are primary- school aged but are currently out of school. According to the 2016 NDP, gross enrollment rate (GER) for primary education is 55.6% in stable environments; in unstable areas in South Central and newly liberated areas, the GER is only 36.8%. Mission Objective 4.2 Strengthen enabling economic environment Justification: Somalia’s lack of current and updated agricultural and economic policy and regulation presents myriad constraints to economic growth. It means there has been no protection of competition, impartial enforcement of contracts, or other measures to assure that the success of businesses and investors benefit Somalia as a whole. Investor protections, property rights, and the ability to enforce contracts are very weak. The time and cost of export/import is inefficient and inconsistent. There are no conventional financial institutions currently providing the full range of banking services needed in Somalia. Notwithstanding these constraints, Somalia’s private sector is one of the country’s most valuable assets and an important partner for development actors. Somalis are extraordinarily entrepreneurial and willing to take risks. Despite the unstable environment, diaspora investors in particular are aggressively exploring investment opportunities. FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Approved: September 14, 2018 8 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 4. Management Objectives Management Objective 1 Frequent and flexible travel throughout the city of Mogadishu and to provincial Somali destinations Justification: To meet U.S. national security objectives, the U.S. Mission to Somalia will need to engage with a full range of Somali contacts throughout the city of Mogadishu and to provincial Somali destinations. Management Objective 2 Assignment of permanent U.S. and hiring of LE staff in Mogadishu Justification: Our diplomatic, development, and law enforcement/security presence must keep pace with requirements in Somalia. Management Objective 3 Begin constructing a more robust facility (the Somalia Interim Facility) Justification: While our current plans for U.S. Mission presence in Mogadishu is sufficient for today, the national security interests of the United States would be better served by an independent and larger facility. FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Approved: September 14, 2018 9