QUESTION: You've repeatedly emphasized your pursuit of a diplomatic solution with Iran over its nuclear program, although you've always had the caveat that you don't rule out any options. The only danger, it would seem, from an extended diplomatic process is that throughout the time the Iranians can continue enriching uranium, refine their sort of mastery of nuclear technology. Do you think it's possible to pursue a diplomatic strategy for the rest of the Administration?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, obviously, the problem with an extended process is exactly the one that you've noted, that they continue to practice. After all, enriching and reprocessing is actually an engineering issue. It's not really a scientific issue. The scientific breakthrough is already there. So it's practicing.
I do think that there are some questions about how rapidly they are improving their capability. It seems to me that there have been what appear to be some exaggerated claims (inaudible) by Ahmadi-Nejad about how well they're doing in enriching and reprocessing.
So we have whatever time we have, and I have spent most of my effort trying to impress upon people that there is urgency but that there is also a path that, if we pursue it urgently and persistently, can lead to a change in Iranian behavior. I don't think that we have fully exhausted the range of means that we can use to isolate Iran and to press for a different course from the Iranians, and only now are you beginning to get the Europeans, for instance, talking about European Union sanctions that would be tougher than the ones that we've been able to get in the Security Council. You're seeing an accelerating number of financial institutions, companies that won't deal with Iran, not because of anything that we've done but because the reputational and investment risk of dealing with a country that's in a Chapter 7 circumstance is gaining steam. So I think there's still time to (inaudible) but there is some urgency.
QUESTION: What else are you thinking? What are things you haven't fully exhausted yet? What else besides --
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I think we can designate many more entities. We can make it hard for Iran to use the international financial system for bad purposes. And everybody will remember what happened with the North Korean situation; even after we were prepared to return the money to North Korea, it was very hard to do because people were concerned about being afoul of American sanctions.
And we can do a lot more in the Security Council and we can do a lot more outside the Security Council. I think we just have to get about the business of doing it.
QUESTION: When you talk about designating more entities, are you talking about the Quds Force?
SECRETARY RICE: It's certainly something that we're considering and I remember that the problem with the Quds Force is that it has a network of activities in support of terrorism, but it also, we believe, has a network of activities in support of proliferation. And there have been some Quds Force individuals and entities already designated, and we'll look at the prospect of doing it the organization as a whole.
QUESTION: And at what point does the diplomatic door close and the military one opens? Do you have (inaudible) how many centrifuges need to be (inaudible) and so forth? Is there a sort of a tipping point that you are looking at?
SECRETARY RICE: I don't think we - I don't think about it in those terms, Sue. We know that the longer this goes on, the better they're able to perfect the technology. So I don't know that there's a tripping point.
But again, I would just note that there is - there's urgency to doing it and there's urgency to moving the diplomatic track forward. But they also are experiencing some - there's a sense that their isolation is growing, and I think you're seeing concerns among some of the leadership about that. And we just have to continue to pursue that path.
QUESTION: Well, was Kouchner right to suggest that the world should prepare for the possibility of war if diplomacy doesn't actually succeed?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I think our version of that would be that you never take any option off the table. But I think what - let me not comment on what Bernard said or didn't say. That's not fair to him. But what is very clear is that France is determined to reinvigorate the diplomatic track.
One of the things that I will say to my colleagues when I meet them in a couple of days is that we can't afford to let the international community and the world lose faith in the diplomatic track. And I do think that we are experiencing some loss of faith and even credibility in the diplomatic track if it starts to grind to a halt. And that's why we have to keep moving on the UN Security Council track. It's why it's a good thing that the Iranians signed an agreement with the IAEA to try to deal with past measures, although we think it's a relatively weak agreement. But even if it deals with past measures, we have to deal with the current problem and the future prospects.
And so I will say to my colleagues that if the diplomatic track cannot demonstrate vitality, then I think people are going to start to make other choices. And you have heard the French when Bernard Kouchner was with me say that, you know, the Europeans are looking at what they can do for European sanctions.
QUESTION: By people, do you mean the Israelis are going to start making other choices?
SECRETARY RICE: No, I said - no, I said the Europeans are looking at what can be done. One has to worry about the potential proliferation aspects and that people start to think that Iran is going to succeed, that people start making their own choices about how they defend themselves. And so it's extremely important that the diplomatic track shows some life.
QUESTION: Speaking of which, do you feel like you're any closer since the P-5+1 meeting on Friday to getting agreement on elements of a resolution, a third sanctions resolution?
SECRETARY RICE: I understand from Nick Burns that they had a good meeting, but I don't expect that - this meeting that we're going to have is not to finalize a text or decide on a text or anything of that sort. It's more in the way of plotting the strategy of the way forward so that we can tell the world that the dual-track strategy is alive and well and being pursued. But I don't expect to sit with my colleagues and look at text and try to agree on a text. I think that's going to take somewhat longer. As we're taking - as we take more steps, more interests get involved and it just takes longer.
QUESTION: Secretary Rice, does the talk of war help or hurt your diplomatic efforts? I mean, it's out there. It's chatter. How do you feel about it?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I think that it's not really the - I wouldn't characterize it as a talk of war. I think I would characterize it as people speculating on what would happen if the diplomatic track doesn't succeed. And I don't think that speculating on it really is helpful. Everybody knows that we aren't taking any options off the table, and I think that's enough said, frankly.
QUESTION: On that, the talks between Ambassador Crocker and his Iranian counterpart haven't really (inaudible) yet at all, from what I've heard anyway. Do you see any point in continuing with these talks?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, it's very interesting that my counterpart in the Iraq meeting made a point of saying that they are open to continuing them if the Iraqis want to continue. I think we take the view that we're obviously interested in what the Iraqis think about this, but we also need to have a sense that this is going to lead someplace.
There's some benefit, I think particularly since the Iraqis are a part of these meetings, to a trilateral format. But since they haven't gone very far thus far, since we really haven't seen a diminution in Iranian activity of the kind that we're concerned about, I think we have to be careful not just to get into talks for the sake of talks.
QUESTION: So are you saying here that you don't think it's worthwhile to continue --
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I'm saying I think we leave that channel open. But I don't see that we're going to pursue it imminently.
QUESTION: Can we go to North Korea for a sec? The six-party talks are going to start this week again. Chris Hill recently suggested that North Korea could be taken off the state sponsors of terrorism list before it completely denuclearizes. Is the United States willing to consider removing North Korea from the state sponsors list even if it has not fully addressed the Japanese concerns about their abductees? Can you do that without a full accounting on the abductees?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, the state sponsor of terrorism list has a kind of internal logic; in other words, there's a set of measures, a set of indices that are supposed to be met in order to come off the state sponsor of terrorism list. And I think we need to look at those. And we are going through the process of seeing if North Korea meets those tests.
There is obviously some advantage to doing something like that in conjunction with the next phase of North Korean - of the six-party talks, and the next phase, of course, is disablement and declaration.
We have been very clear with the Japanese - and we have very good cooperation and coordination on this - that we are not going to forget the abduction issue. In fact, it is a subject for discussion every time Chris speaks with the North Koreans. We're going to keep pressing it. It's a really horrible humanitarian situation. It was a terrible thing to do and it needs to be resolved.
We've also been very active in pressing for and I think helping to move forward the bilateral DPRK-Japan track, which is really where this has to be resolved. But I don't think that we want to get into a situation in which we have locked all of the steps that we might take with the North Koreans and lock them into a certain sequence with other steps that we think need to be taken. We have to be able to use whatever incentives we have that are appropriate to the stage at which we are with the North Koreans.
But if we get to that point, it will be a very fortunate thing, so right now I think we're just concentrating on trying to get a disablement schedule and a declaration that is full and complete.
QUESTION: It sounds like what you're saying is that, in fact, you would consider taking them off, even if you don't drop the abductee issue, even if it's not fully resolved, you've got to be able to --
SECRETARY RICE: We'll consider the right sequence and the right set of steps as we approach the reality - hopefully the reality - of a disablement schedule.
QUESTION: Do you think you're going to be able to get to a disablement schedule and possibly - and among the other incentives that you have is the fuel oil -- in this next meeting in Beijing - is that something you're hoping to pull off?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I certainly hope after what were pretty fruitful discussions that the three expert teams had when they went to North Korea - the Russians, the Chinese and the United States went to look at the - survey the facilities there - they obviously had good cooperation. They had good meetings. So that gives some hope that there is going to be a good outcome on disablement, but the proof will be in the pudding. It's important never can count that - to count those chickens before they - before you're in the room with the North Koreans.
QUESTION: Madame Secretary, a few questions about Arabs and Israelis. Even though the Administration won't comment on what the Israeli air strikes in Syria were about, does the U.S. have any reason to believe that Syria is either starting its own nuclear program or receiving some sort of technology from other countries?
SECRETARY RICE: Look, we worry about all of the regimes that - of this type and they're - they are not transparent regimes. They are regimes that there are constant reports of activity to try and get unconventional weapons. It's something that we - you know, we worry about all the time. The President made very clear that the biggest threat for us would be to start to see some of the most - some of the worst regimes, particularly with those ties to terrorism, trying to acquire some of the world's most dangerous weapons.
So it's a real, real concern for us. That's why we've got very active nonproliferation policies -- the PSI. I think one of the major things that we did was to break up the A.Q. Khan network, which was a source for regimes that might wish to go underground to get nuclear technologies. Yes, it's a constant concern.
QUESTION: Syria specifically?
SECRETARY RICE: We watch Syria and any number of other regimes very, very closely.
QUESTION: What do you - what do you want Syria to do to show that it's committed to Israeli-Palestinian peace? Close down Hamas, Islamic Jihad offices in Damascus?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, it would help if they started by pressuring those who are dependent on Syria, like Hamas that is based in Damascus to, for instance, return Corporal Shalit -- that would be a good step; to put pressure on those organizations, those militias that are firing Qassam rockets into Israel. There are any number of things that they could do. They certainly - pressing Hamas to accept the international consensus about a two-state solution would be very helpful. That's in addition to perhaps the most acute Syrian behavior, which is in Lebanon, where the reign of intimidation by, if not Syria, allies of Syria against the Lebanese is, I think, increasingly well documented. I can't tell you who is responsible for these assassination attempts, but I can tell you that those who don't want to see a sovereign Lebanon in which the democratic choices of Lebanese people are respected and elections that are constitutional have every incentive to be involved in this kind of reign of intimidation and assassination.
QUESTION: And on the peace conference the Israelis and Palestinians that you're arranging, have you set a date and a place for that yet?
SECRETARY RICE: No. We'll do it in the fall and - which obviously means before the end of the year. We've wanted to try and support more movement along the bilateral track before trying to set a date. But the conference is coming into greater relief. You know, we're starting to - after many of the consultations that we've had, we're starting to give it more of a - more clarity about what it will do.
QUESTION: What would you consider a breakthrough at this conference?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I'd certainly consider it a breakthrough if this meeting, which it must do, takes us from where we are now with the Israelis and Palestinians, which is, I think, a pretty strong commitment on the part of the leaders, to try and lay a foundation for their - for the two-state solution to a next step toward that two-state solution. I can't tell you right now whether that means that they make some further - they find some process by which to make further progress on understandings, whether it means that they actually start negotiations. I think a lot depends on what happens in the bilateral track on the next weeks.
But I was just at the AHLC meeting that Norway chaired, which is the donor coordination mechanism for the Palestinians, and it was quite a remarkable atmosphere of guarded optimism because, for the first time in a long time, the Palestinian-Israeli track is moving. It may not be moving as rapidly as people would like. It - you know, it has a character of being still a set of informal discussions rather than negotiations. But step by step, from where they were in February after the Mecca agreement, they've come a very, very long way. They are now discussing these issues, these core issues, for the first time since 2000. And it's worth saying that it's, in a sense, the same - many of the same Palestinians, but this is an Israeli Government that is representative of a part of the Israeli political space that was not supportive of the last round. Likud and Ariel Sharon's progeny, Kadima, were not there the last time around. And we've had a series of steps, I think starting with the President's declarations in 2002, moving through Sharon's Herzliya speech in 2003 about dividing the land and accepting the Palestinian state, moving through the much maligned roadmap, which I think should not be maligned because it helped to gather consensus around what would be the obligations leading to a two-state solution, elections in the Palestinian territories that brought Abbas, elections that brought Hamas to leadership, Hamas' recognition then that it could not govern, Hamas' decision then to launch the coup d'etat in Gaza, which while it has created a difficult situation did then refocus attention on the Palestinians who are prepared to support the two-state solution, a good government in the Palestinian territories then leading to the breakthrough, I think, with Israeli that you're seeing now. So it's been a series of steps and the ground has shifted now. And there was some optimism - again, guarded - that we can take advantage of this string of events and where we are now to move this process forward.
QUESTION: Can I take you to Europe, the continent that I come from, for a couple of questions?
SECRETARY RICE: Yes.
QUESTION: Can I just ask about the Saudis for one minute also?
QUESTION: Go ahead. Sorry.
QUESTION: In your discussions with the Saudis this week, have they given you any indication whether they are prepared to come and under what conditions?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, I think that not much has changed since Prince Saud said when we were in Jeddah that they are - would be keen to participate in a conference that is - I think he said substantive and serious and dealt with core issues. And that's what we intend to do.
Now, we have work to do, I think still, that there's an understanding of the participants that this meeting is going to, in fact, move the process forward. And so I'm not expecting that people are now going to - start saying tomorrow, oh yes, we'll come. But I can tell you that we had a really good discussion last night between the Quartet and the Arab League Committee representatives and there was a very strong sense that we have now a joint responsibility to use the opportunity of this international meeting to move things forward. And a lot of talk about, I think even in their public statement, that they want to work to make this a success. They talked about partnership in making a success. So I think we've made some progress.
QUESTION: Sorry.
QUESTION: Sorry. Kosovo is one of the looming crises between now and the end of the year. Is the United States considering unilaterally recognizing Kosovo as independent if no broader agreement is reached in the Security Council this year?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, the United States is certainly committed to the logic of the Ahtisaari plan. And the logic of the Ahtisarri plan is that there isn't going to be a reunification of Serbia and Kosovo, and that both Kosovo and Serbia need to get on with their futures and leave behind their past.
We have committed to 120 days to see if the circumstances, the atmosphere, even some of the actual moves that the two sides could make, could make it a more amicable outcome. But in the final analysis, you know, the President was very clear when he was in Albania that there is going to be an independent Kosovo. Now, the question of how we get there, who else - I do believe the Europeans are in the same posture. How we get there, I think, is what's still to be determined. But there's going to be an independent Kosovo. We're dedicated to that. I think it's the only potential - the only solution that is potentially stabilizing for the Balkans rather than destabilizing for the Balkans.
We want very much to have good relations with Serbia and for Serbia to find its European home, but it's going to be difficult for Serbia to find a European home if it holds on to - you know, to old hopes. It's really time for everybody to move forward.
I've heard good things, frankly, about the meetings that have been going on, good things about the coordination and work that Russia, the EU and the United States are doing together in the troika. There are new ideas on the table, not about the actual status but about some of the tools and mechanisms that might be used to make relations between Serbia and Kosovo smoother. The Kosovars could do more, and we're pressing them to do more, to assure everyone that they really are going to live up to the other logic of the Ahtisaari plan, which is that this has to be a state that is completely devoted to minority rights, religious protections and so forth.
QUESTION: Some of the diplomats involved say that the problem is that the Kosovars and the Serbs have no real incentive to negotiate seriously because they count on the Russians to veto a resolution and the Kosovars have no incentive because they can count on the United States to recognize UDI. What's your response to that?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, frankly, I was concerned about the same thing. Now, we've told the Kosovars that we don't think that a unilateral declaration of independence is a very good idea and so we need to go through this process.
I've been pleasantly surprised, as somebody who is fairly skeptical about what could be achieved, that I do think they're making some progress. Not that the Serbs and the Kosovars have - are suddenly going to come to the same understanding of what the final status will look like, but they are making, I think, some progress on some of the other issues that could lead to a more amicable and sustainable outcome at the end of this. And as I said, there's been good feeling about the cooperation between the EU, Russia and the United States.
QUESTION: Do you feel at the end of the process it will - you'll be prepared to let the European Union, as it were, take the lead in determining the final status, or do you think it's going to take American leadership to get the Europeans there?
SECRETARY RICE: Oh, I think it'll take the United States and Europe together on this one and when I talk to the Europeans, they all say, you know, we know that Europe - the Europeans say about themselves that they know that ultimately, the Balkans is, of course, much closer to Europe than to the United States and they need a stable Balkans so they're going to have to do - they're going to have to take the tough decisions and do the right thing.
QUESTION: New French Government, new French president, quite a new foreign policy as well. How are you enjoying the ride and --
SECRETARY RICE: (Laughter.)
QUESTION: -- what is the United States prepared to do to encourage the French to rejoin NATO's military structure?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, the French have to make this - these decisions about the relationship to NATO and the - we have had, I think, really good cooperation with the French Government. Bernard is a really excellent partner. We talk frequently. He has, I think, reinvigorated French foreign policy on a number of fronts; really great leadership on Darfur, I think. Also, we've worked very hard together on Lebanon, which is much in need of help. I was very appreciative that he went to Iraq. I think that was an important signal.
And so it has been a very good and active partnership, but it's as much the degree to which France's foreign policy is much more active and I do think there's been a reinvigoration of it. And that is - it is really good to have French leadership. We've also - even though we won't always agree about the role of NATO or theological questions about NATO, some of the rather more mundane bureaucratic -- cul-de-sacs that we used to get into seem not to be there any longer and we've been able to move forward on a number of things, for instance, for Afghanistan, that have been very important. So whatever happens in terms of the broader relationship with NATO, I think the alliance is functioning pretty well right now.
QUESTION: And do you expect to see them back in the military (inaudible)?
SECRETARY RICE: That's for the French to determine. I'm - it's not even a question to ask at this point - of us to ask of them at this point.
QUESTION: Perhaps in contrast, Germany - you know, you were quite happy at the start --
SECRETARY RICE: Yes.
QUESTION: -- with a Chancellor Merkel (inaudible). Is there not a sense now that, you know, the Germans are tempted to shrink from some of the difficult responsibilities on issues such as troop deployment in Afghanistan, sanctions on Iran, taking responsibility in Kosovo?
SECRETARY RICE: On Iran, we've had good - continuing good cooperation with Germany and there frankly hasn't been - I know there have been some contacts and there's always going to - at lower levels at least, in the newspapers, the Germans said this, the Germans said that. But you know, in the final analysis, when I'm with Frank-Walter Steinmeier or Nick is with his new counterparts, the Germans are right there for the two-track strategy that we developed two years ago in London. So I have no complaints about German policies on Iran.
Similarly on Kosovo, I think we are counting on German leadership along with France and others. And to me, there is - I see no evidence that they intend to do anything but what we all agreed to do, which is to use 120 days to see how far we can get, but ultimately, to see - to recognize that the outcomes in the Balkans have to be stabilizing outcomes and there aren't many - it's not as if we have a lot of options.
Now as to Germany and Afghanistan, this - I sometimes think we lose sight of what a dramatic change we have seen in what, first, NATO and also Germany are actually doing in Afghanistan. Paul, you're an old Europe hand and how many debates did we sit around having about whether NATO could go out of area? Well, you know, Afghanistan is pretty far out of area and nobody's really spending a lot of time having that debate anymore. And NATO is providing a small planning element for Darfur. And (inaudible) NATO has broken through the theology about what it is about and it is a transformed alliance.
Part of that transformation has been starting with the Balkans, but now, really in Afghanistan, a more active German presence with a force that, for 50 years, defined its role as a static defensive force against potential Soviet aggression - or 40 years and then has taken a while to transform it; that this is hard for Germany, that it takes time for this transformation to take place both in terms of the character of its forces and the nature of its forces, I mean literally, their capabilities.
And the debates in the Bundestag and the German mindset about this shouldn't be surprising to anyone. I think we should be really very supportive of what Germany is doing. Of course, we worry about caveats when we talk about those things, but you know, this is a country that's come a long way in terms of its willingness to undertake external responsibilities after many, many years of essentially being a continental static force. So you know, it's not a bad story; it's a good story. And just because there are challenges and it isn't always as rapid as we might hope, we shouldn't denigrate what the Germans achieved. I think it's pretty remarkable.
QUESTION: We're about two-thirds of the way through this.
SECRETARY RICE: All right.
QUESTION: I'd like to get some quick ones.
MR. MCCORMACK: Ten minutes left.
QUESTION: Ten minutes left, okay, thanks.
The Pakistani police in recent days have made a series of arrests of opposition political activists. You saw what happened with Nawaz Sharif; turned around within hours. Do you think that Musharraf is getting more authoritarian the closer we get to his election?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, we've been really clear with Pakistan that we expect these elections to be free and fair. John Negroponte was there and he had long discussions. Some of this is still being adjudicated in the Pakistani system and the very fact that it is being adjudicated in the Pakistani system says something about how far Pakistan has come.
But look, it's - there are troubling elements here and the best outcome is going to be for Pakistan to have elections. I think the parliamentary elections in particular are going to need to meet a standard that everybody can say, well, yes, that was a (inaudible) election in which people had a chance to voice their views and where the outcomes are recognizably free and fair. But it's - yeah, some of this is troubling and we've certainly told the Pakistanis that it's troubling and they know our views on this. I hope that some of this is being adjudicated in the system. We're still within a Pakistani system. We'll reinforce the sense of free and fair elections in Pakistan, not undermine them.
QUESTION: I have just a couple of questions on Iraq. Does not the Blackwater incident make it harder for you to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis or does it essentially add to the (inaudible) of what many regard as an occupation?
SECRETARY RICE: You know, Sue, I keep hearing this word about occupation. Let me just remind everybody to begin with that we're there under a UN mandate and we're there under a UN mandate because the Iraqis are not yet able to secure themselves from some of the most awful forces in the Middle East, including al-Qaida, where they're starting to be able to secure themselves.
And extremists of all stripes who have embedded themselves in militias and were going into towns and, you know, killing the men and sending the women into exile and - you know, so I think Iraqis understand that these forces are there to help them. And with the exception of the Sadrists, the leaders of Iraq who do not - nobody wants to have to have foreign forces do this for you. Of course, they'd rather be able to do it themselves. But to a person, including Maliki when he was in the meeting here, and when we were there and what all of them have said to us is, we know we can't do it for ourselves; please don't leave precipitously and leave a vacuum.
So I think we have to get under this notion of occupying forces. Nobody wants - really wants to have foreign forces do everything for them. They'd like to be able to do it themselves.
QUESTION: (Inaudible).
SECRETARY RICE: Now as to Blackwater, yeah, I have asked for a thorough internal review of our processes and I think shortly, we will be getting even some outside help to take a hard look, because a lot has changed in the years since we first went there and it is - there is an Iraqi Government that was not there in 2003. And yeah, we have to take a hard look.
I'd just mention two points, though. One is we have to be able to provide security for our diplomats so that they can do the work that they need to do to help Iraqis become self-sufficient. When people are traveling around and in the Red Zone, it's very often to go to someplace like the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Health to help train people in the Ministry of Health so that they are capable of doing this work themselves. So the purpose of our people going out is to help the Iraqis become self-sufficient.
As to Blackwater itself, these people have protected us, they've lost their own people, and so that has to be recognized too. And this all goes on in extremely dangerous circumstances, so before we jump to any conclusions about what needs to be done, I think we have to recognize that we need contract security, we will look at how we use it, we will look at every aspect of how we use it, and we'll work with the Iraqi Government to be sensitive to their concerns about Iraqi sovereignty.
QUESTION: Just a quick follow-up. Who's going to be providing this outside help?
SECRETARY RICE: I'll get back to you.
QUESTION: Promise?
SECRETARY RICE: I promise. (Laughter.) He'll get back to you.
QUESTION: Madame Secretary, can we just talk briefly about Burma, which is very much in the headlines at the moment? You said yesterday - I think that you were keeping a close eye on events (inaudible) people of Burma's freedom. But beyond that, is there nothing that the (inaudible) thinks it can do to encourage the (inaudible) rulers to move towards democracy?
SECRETARY RICE: This is a place where the international community's got to stand up much more than it has. The UN Security Council had an informal discussion of Burma several months ago that we worked really, really hard and intensively to get scheduled when it should have been easy to get scheduled a discussion of what was going on in Burma.
It's time for the Security Council to look at what action it can take on Burma. The UN Security Council - the UN - the Secretary General's Permanent Representative, I hope, will go to Burma, but he needs to be able to see not just the regime, but he needs to be able to see Aung San Suu Kyi and other prisoners. I think what the Burmese junta is doing is just a reminder how really brutal this regime is, how impervious they have been to international pressure, and frankly, there hasn't been enough international pressure.
Now some are starting to speak out. The ASEAN states have finally started to speak out and I think that's important. But the Security Council shouldn't allow this to continue and I think you'll see it's pressing more for Security Council action.
QUESTION: But as you said, there doesn't seem to have been much interest; in fact, the opposite of interest from, certainly, China and to a certain extent Russia in really saying anything. So --
SECRETARY RICE: Yeah. Well, maybe --
QUESTION: -- how can you get around that?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, but maybe these latest events where, you know - it's one thing to say that the junta ought to allow freeing political prisoners and that what is going on with great activists like Aung San Suu Kyi needs to be - it adds a layer of intensity when you have Burmese going to the streets to protest the brutal treatment and therefore, the activities of religious people. I think there's a new dynamic in what the world is seeing in Burma and the international community ought to be supportive of it.
QUESTION: Okay. A number of - an issue that's been very much on the - has been on the front burner of the Security Council is Darfur. The United Nations and the African Union are getting together a very large force to go there, but do you believe that that force, when it is on the ground, will actually act robustly to protect (inaudible) in case there are (inaudible) acts of violence and what would the U.S. do if the force proved unable or unwilling to do that?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, the President's been clear that we continue to look for options. We - but - look, I think we ought to give the force a chance and not prejudge it as unable to do that. We - there is no secret that we argued for somewhat stronger language in the Security Council resolution about the mandate, but ultimately, we think the mandate is sufficient. And in our explanation of both, we made very clear what we think the mandate means.
So the first order of business so as to actually raise the force is to get them outfitted and get them on the ground. And there have been some - you know, been some slowness in that. There have been some hiccups about which forces can go in and the like, but we're pressing very hard and the Secretary General -- I spoke with the other night, is pressing very hard.
The other piece of this is the peace process continues and even though it has not yet resulted in all of the rebels being prepared to engage, it has resulted in a lot of the rebels being willing to engage. So let's get the force - actually get the force raised, let's get it outfitted and let's get it in. And then I think there will be a lot of pressure for it to fully use its mandate.
QUESTION: Do you think the African Union has played a constructive role in putting that force together?
SECRETARY RICE: I think it's played a constructive role, but it needs to play a more urgent role.
QUESTION: Can we ask one last one?
SECRETARY RICE: Sure.
QUESTION: Glenn Kessler's book - and I know you haven't read it, but --
SECRETARY RICE: No, I haven't.
QUESTION: -- suggests that you're now trying to fix the mistakes of when you were National Security Advisor. It's a fairly harsh verdict.
You've acknowledged in the past some missteps in Iraq, but are you concerned that your legacy is going to be overwhelmed by Iraq regardless of what progress you've made on North Korea getting to a nuclear deal, maybe the Israeli-Palestinian track, that Iraq will simply overwhelm it all?
SECRETARY RICE: First of all, Arshad, I am not worried about my legacy. With 14 months to go, I'm worrying about what we've yet achieved on the Palestinian-Israeli track, on the - with the North Korean nuclear issue, with the India civil-nuclear deal, trade agreements and we've got a big agenda.
Look, I'm proud that we overthrew Saddam Hussein. I'll just be very clear with you. I don't consider it an issue of legacy. I consider it an issue of having done the right thing. And because I know that big historical changes take time to play out, I'm quite confident that today's headlines and history's judgment are rarely the same. So for me, the issue is what do we do to help put Iran - or Iraq into a sustainable position from the point of view of American policy.
I think that had you told us that the breakthroughs in Iraq were likely to come in what we used to call the Sunni Triangle with a Sunni - the emergence of local Sunni leadership that actually is well on its way to defeating al-Qaida and, by the way, will be the first place that al-Qaida's political, ideological philosophy has been tested and has been roundly rejected by Arabs. I think nobody would have - perhaps some would have seen that coming, but I don't think that's how you would have thought this would play out.
So we've had to make a lot of difficult decisions and we've made a lot of big historical decisions and they will play out over time. But I'll tell you that I think the decisions that we made in 2001 and 2002 and 2003 are now the decisions that have put us in a position to press forward on the establishment of a Palestinian state. I walked you through the six years that have led us to where we are now. I think that those are the decisions that have led us to a place where you have an Iraq in which you no longer have a dictator who was an avowed enemy of the United States, but yes, a fragile democratic government that actually is going to be friendly to the United States; similarly in Afghanistan.
I think the decisions that we made to go to a six-party framework for the North Korea situation when everybody was telling us, oh, just go and negotiate this in a bilateral track; that six-party framework has now paid off and that's why you're getting the outcomes that you have.
So actually, I think I'm reaping the benefits of decisions that were made when I was National Security Advisor and that is, I think, the way that history often turns out.
QUESTION: Just one more? Over here?
SECRETARY RICE: Quick, uh-huh.
QUESTION: You just said that you're looking at what you can do to help put Iraq in a sustainable position. The President said last week or the week before, this would extend beyond his presidency. Do you see Iraq in a sustainable position by the time the next president takes over or what's your hope - where is your hope - what's your hope, to be at what goal by then?
SECRETARY RICE: I think that what you are beginning to see is a recognition, a fairly wide recognition that whatever you think about how the United States got into Iraq, that an American commitment to Iraq - not at the levels that we are now, but an American commitment to Iraq for some significant period of time is going to be critical not just to stabilizing Iraq, but to stabilizing the Middle East.
And I want to take one second to talk about what I mean by stabilizing the Middle East, because there is a narrative that says that the Middle East was perfectly stable and then we decided to overthrow Saddam Hussein, we decided by our - by the way, that Yasser Arafat was not a man of peace and so we wouldn't deal with him, and so we didn't - decided not to pursue a Palestinian state and by the way, we introduced all this notion about democracy and that destabilized things and why can't we just go back to the Middle East as it was.
And I would just remind people what the Middle East was. The Middle East was a place in which in 2001, we inherited a situation in which the Camp David Accords had collapsed and - Camp David process had collapsed, Arafat had declared the second Intifada, Ariel Sharon had been brought to power not to make peace with the Palestinians, but to defeat them.
And if you look at where we are now, you would not have guessed that in 2007, we would be talking about an international conference to perhaps move toward the establishment of a Palestinian state. In 2001, you had al-Qaida burrowed in to Afghanistan, you had a Middle East which had a kind of little secret, which was that these authoritarian regimes in the Middle East were providing no potential outlet for legitimate, healthy political competition. But there was plenty of political competition; it was just taking place in a radical mosque. And the explosion that was literally the explosion of September 11th was the realization that those - that kind of politics had taken a virulent form in the emergence of al-Qaida.
In 2001, you had Syrian forces occupying Lebanon for decades, Hezbollah in complete control of the south. That gave way to a Lebanese war and you now have, admittedly, a fragile government in Lebanon, but Lebanese forces throughout the country, Syrian forces out, et cetera.
And perhaps most importantly, in 2001, you had Saddam Hussein in power taking shots at our aircraft as we patrolled no-fly zones and I remember one of the earliest discussions that we had was, what if he got lucky and brought one of them down. You had Saddam Hussein making a mockery of the sanctions that had been put to him through the oil-for-food program, malnutrition rates rising in Iraq because of the sanctions, and Saddam Hussein still threatening his neighbors and with an insatiable appetite to one day restart his weapons of mass destruction programs. Yeah, now it's a fragile government in Iraq, but he's gone.
My point is that yes, the Middle East has a lot of challenges left now and we have to help, over the next 14 months, to put all of this back in - to put this on a more stable footing. But we shouldn't somehow think that it was a stable Middle East in 2001. It was anything but and one way or another, that Middle East was going to come apart. Now that it has -- now that there is a chance to rebuild it, I think that the decisions that were taken in 2001, 2002, 2003 have actually created new opportunities. We just have a few months to try and seize them.
QUESTION: Are you going to write your own book, Madame Secretary?
SECRETARY RICE: I'll write some kind of book, sure, yeah. (Laughter.) Probably one of those boring academic tomes that maybe you all won't read, but --
QUESTION: Really.
(Laughter.)
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
SECRETARY RICE: Yeah, that's right, that's right. I like writing those kinds of books. That's what I've done for a living before now.
QUESTION: Thank you for your time.
SECRETARY RICE: Thank you. Thank you very much.
QUESTION: Thanks very much.
2007/806