7 FAM 050
NO DOUBLE STANDARD POLICY
(CT:CON-804; 04-30-2018)
(Office of Origin: CA/OCS)
7 FAM 051 Unassigned
(CT:CON-772; 01-05-2018)
7 FAM 052 NO DOUBLE STANDARD POLICY
7 FAM 052.1 Statement of Policy
(CT:CON-662; 04-27-2016)
In administering the Consular Information Program, the
Department of State applies a no double standard policy to important security
threat information, including criminal information.
Generally, if the Department shares information with the official
U.S. community, it should also make the same or similar information available
to the non-official U.S. community if the underlying threat applies to both
official and non-official U.S. citizens/nationals.
If a post issues information to its employees about potentially
dangerous situations, it should evaluate whether the potential danger could
also affect private U.S. citizens/nationals living in or traveling through the
affected area.
If so, post should notify the Department and request approval of
dissemination of the post-issued information to the public. In such cases, the
CA/OCS/ACS Director will coordinate with the CA/OCS Managing Director,
CA/OCS/ACS staff, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Threat Investigations and
Analysis (DS/ITA) country officer, the regional desk officer, and others as
appropriate to the situation at hand.
The policy is not intended to prevent the limited distribution of
information about threats to specific U.S. citizens/nationals or U.S.
organizations. The Department may share credible security-related information
on a limited basis when directed toward a specific target or when appropriate
to counter a particular threat. The Regional Security Officer normally
performs this "duty to warn" function at post.
All "duty to warn" threat notifications made to U.S.
private sector organizations at post must be coordinated with the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, Threat Investigations and Analysis, Overseas Security
Advisory Council (DS/TIA/OSAC) to ensure simultaneous or near-simultaneous
threat warning is also conveyed to the domestic headquarters of the U.S.
organization.
7 FAM 052.2 Security Threats
7 FAM 052.2-1 Departments Role
(CT:CON-662; 04-27-2016)
a. The security threat information contained in Travel
Alerts, Travel Warnings, Worldwide Cautions, and Messages is derived from
threat information gathered from multiple sources, including our posts, the
U.S. intelligence community, open sources, and our allies.
b. When security threat information is received, the
relevant bureaus in the Department and other U.S. Government agencies attempt
to evaluate whether a security threat is credible, specific (aimed at a
particular individual or group and/or identifying a time and place), and
non-counterable (cannot be avoided by taking appropriate measures).
c. If a threat evaluated as credible, specific, and
non-counterable is targeted to a specific U.S. organization or individual, and
is unlikely to impact others, then the Department, either directly or through
post, may notify only that organization or individual of the threat without
risk of triggering the Department's "No Double Standard" policy (See:
7 FAM 052.1).
For example, if easily identifiable members of the local U.S. community, such
as employees of a particular U.S. company, are targeted, there would normally
be no need to disseminate the threat information beyond that identified
organization.
d. If a threat evaluated as credible, specific, and
non-counterable is aimed at a broad group (e.g., U.S. citizens/nationals,
and/or U.S. interests generally), the Department may authorize the relevant
post(s) to issue a Message, and may also issue or update a Travel Alert, Travel
Warning, or Worldwide Caution.
7 FAM 052.2-2 Origin of Policy
(CT:CON-453; 04-01-2013)
In 1990, Congress passed the Aviation Security Improvement
Act, which, in Section 109, added to the Federal Aviation Act a requirement
that the President "develop guidelines for ensuring notification to the
public of threats to civil aviation in appropriate cases. The Act requires
that the guidelines identify the officials responsible for deciding whether
public notification of a threat is in the best interests of the United States
and the traveling public, based on a consideration of, inter alia, the
specificity of the threat, the credibility of the information, and the ability
to counter the threat. The guidelines were to be distributed to appropriate
officials in the Departments of Transportation, State, and Justice, as well as
to air carriers. The law prohibits selective notification of a threat to civil
aviation to only selective potential travelers unless the threat applies only
to them. These and other related provisions are now codified in 49 U.S.C.
44905. After enactment of these provisions, the Department decided to follow
similar policies in non-civil aviation contexts.
7 FAM 053 Coordination of Threat
Information with the Military Under the No Double Standard Policy
(CT:CON-772; 01-05-2018)
a. It can be consistent with the "no double
standard" policy for the Department of State to determine that sharing
information with private U.S. citizens is not appropriate in cases
where the Department of Defense (DoD)
releases threat information to military personnel. For example, upon receiving
information concerning a possible threat to U.S. citizens in a particular
country, the chief of mission (COM) may conclude that the information is not
credible. In this case, the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) would not
recommend releasing the information to other DOS personnel and private U.S.
citizens in country. However, a military commander, upon receiving the same
threat information, might decide to release the threat information to U.S.
troops in country, or might confine the troops to their base without informing
them of the alleged threat. The paragraphs below provide a clarification of
how military procedures relate to the "no double standard" policy.
b. DoD Personnel Under Military Command: The Department
of Defense is responsible for the safety
and security of DoD personnel under military command. U.S. military commanders
therefore make independent decisions about whether or when to disseminate
threat information to their personnel. Should post become aware of a DoD
notification made locally, post should immediately inform the Department. Once
notified that DoD has disseminated threat formation to their personnel, the
Department of State decides, in conjunction with relevant posts, whether information
about the threat is such that the Department of State should also disseminate
it to the non-official U.S. community.
c. DoD Personnel Under Chief of Mission Authority:
If a DoD officer under COM (for example, Defense Attach) issues a security warning
for other COM personnel (for example, within the DoD Attach office) that
includes threat information that falls under No Double Standard policy, such
information should be shared with the non-official U.S. community.
d. To ensure that
the Department and posts avoid providing contradictory information on security
threats to U.S. citizens/nationals, it is essential that post coordinate with
the Department on public dissemination of any information about potential
threats to the safety and travel of U.S. citizens/nationals. At post, it is
essential for the consular section and the Regional Security Office to put in
place standard operating procedures that ensure close coordination on
disseminating information to the official and/or private U.S. citizen
communities.
e. If you learn of
a security threat, report it to the Department following the established
procedures at your post. At this stage, you should not disseminate information
about the threat beyond those with a "need to know" (i.e., persons
who could develop additional information, help to counter the threat, or help
assess appropriate dissemination) to avoid violating the no double standard
policy. In the event the information is disseminated to U.S. Government
employees and/or others outside of those with a need to know, post should
notify the Department immediately, with the posts senior consular officer
responsible for ensuring that CA/OCS/ACS is among those notified.
f. Remember that
if post concludes it should warn, or has warned, its personnel or any U.S.
Government employees beyond those with a strict need-to-know, whether
permanently stationed or on temporary duty abroad, about a security threat,
post should share that same information with the non-official U.S. community under
the "No Double Standard" policy (see 7 FAM 052). The
Department strongly advises Consular Section Chiefs to review this policy
periodically with the Deputy Chief of Mission and the Regional Security Officer
to ensure close coordination when publishing safety or security threat
information. The policy applies whether the information is shared with U.S.
Government employees in town meetings, in post newsletters, by email, on the
telephone, or by any other means. The threat or warning information might include
information about locations within the host country including hotels,
restaurants, entertainment spots, places of worship, tourist sites, etc.
g. Post should also refrain from developing lists of
"approved" hotels. In providing such lists to the community, you may
actually increase the risk that perpetrators could change the target, thus
increasing the risk to U.S. citizens/nationals who may be relying on such
lists.
h. The Bureau of
Diplomatic Security's Overseas Security Advisory Council (DS/TIA/OSAC) was
created to foster the exchange of security related information between the U.S.
Government and the U.S. private sector operating abroad. OSAC provides the
U.S. private sector with timely information on which to make informed decisions
on how best to protect their personnel, facilities, and other equities. In
addition to this, OSAC is responsible for the interagency coordination of
specific and credible threat warning to U.S. private sector organizations under
the Department's "duty to warn" mandate. Such "tearline"
passage is conveyed domestically by DS/TIA/OSAC to the named organization's
U.S.-based corporate security management and overseas by the Regional Security
Office at the relevant post(s).
i. Post should
not disseminate threat information of a specific, credible, and non-counterable
nature beyond the specific party/parties named in reporting and under threat.
This includes dissemination to the broader OSAC constituency in a country (i.e.
the OSAC Country Council membership, OSAC steering committee, etc.). (This
includes warning conducted in-person (i.e. OSAC Country Council meeting), via
telephone (i.e. conference call), electronically (i.e. an OSAC Google Group or
e-mail), or through any other medium.)
j. Post
management should ensure U.S. Government agencies with personnel under Chief of
Mission Authority understand fully the U.S. Government's "No Double
Standard" policy and Department's guidance on the policy. Chiefs of
mission should advise these U.S. Government agencies that if they share
information on a specific, credible, non-counterable threat with their
employees beyond those with a legitimate "need to know," post must
share that same information with the non-official U.S. community.
k. Nothing in
this section should be interpreted to limit or otherwise hinder the Regional
Security Officer's (RSO) ability to perform the duties and responsibilities
required in 12
FAM 420. Those duties may, however, trigger the "No Double
Standard" policy and require post to take action to warn the non-official
U.S. community using the Consular Information Program mechanism.
7 FAM 054 through 7 FAM
059 Unassigned