5 FAH-2 H-730
Overseas Radio Networks
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(Office of Origin: IRM/FO/ITI/LWS/RPB)
5 FAH-2 H-731 VHF/UHF/HF Radio networks
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(Uniform all agencies)
Missions use very high frequency (VHF)/ ultrahigh frequency
(UHF)/ high frequency (HF) networks for radio communication between mission facilities, residences of mission
personnel, official vehicles, and other posts.
5 FAH-2 H-732 Emergency Action
Committee (EAC) Networks
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(Uniform all agencies)
a. Emergency
Action Committee (EAC) VHF/UHF networks are
designed to fulfill the needs of posts Emergency Action Plan (EAP).
b. The network consists
of a repeater and encryption capable base stations, mobile radios in
selected official vehicles, and hand-held radios. Base stations and encryption loaders
are located in the Information Programs
Center (IPC) and post one. Other base
stations are located at specified residences and offices, which are designated in the posts EAP (See 12
FAH-1 Appendix 7).
5 FAH-2 H-732.1 Emergency and
Evacuation (E&E) Networks
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(Uniform all agencies)
a. Emergency and
Evacuation (E&E) VHF/UHF/HF networks are
designed to fulfill the needs of posts
EAP.
b. The network consists
of a repeater and digital base stations, mobile radios in selected official vehicles, and hand-held radios.
Base stations are located in the Information Programs
Center (IPC) and post one. Other base stations are located at specified
residences and offices, which are designated in the posts
EAP (See 12 FAH-1 Appendix 7).
5 FAH-2 H-732.2 Administrative
Network (ADM)
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(Uniform all agencies)
a. Administrative (ADM) VHF/UHF networks are designed to provide communication to facilitate
daily operations such as facility maintenance, General Services Office (GSO),
and motor pool.
b. The network typically
consists of base stations, mobile radios
in official vehicles, hand-held radios, and
possibly, a repeater. Base stations are at central locations, such as the motor pool, GSO warehouse,
GSO maintenance, and the management section.
A base station or other radio unit is often located with the telephone
operator for emergencies and monitoring.
5 FAH-2 H-732.3 Local Guard Force
(LGF) Networks
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
a. Local guard force
(LGF) VHF/UHF networks are designed to provide communication between guard
posts and mobile patrol vehicles.
b. The network consists
of a repeater and base stations, mobile radios in selected official vehicles,
and hand-held radios. Base stations are located at guard posts and specified
residences and facilities offices, which are designated by the regional
security officer.
5 FAH-2 H-732.4 Ambassador
Protection Detail (APD) Networks
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
a. Ambassador protection
detail (APD) VHF/UHF networks are designed to provide communication for
movements and protection of the ambassador or charg d'affaires.
b. The network consists
of a repeater and encryption capable mobile radios in selected official
vehicles, and hand-held radios.
5 FAH-2 H-732.5 Marine Security
Guard (MSG) Networks
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
a. Marine security guard
(MSG) VHF/UHF/HF networks are designed to provide communication among the MSGs
as they perform their security patrols and quick reaction defensive maneuvers.
b. The network consists
of a repeater and encryption capable digital base stations, mobile radios in
selected official vehicles, and hand-held radios. The base station is
typically located in the marine security guard quarters.
5 FAH-2 H-732.6 Worldwide
Protective Services (WPS) Networks
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
At certain high-threat
posts, DS deploys protective details for COM personnel under its WPS contract.
Subscriber equipment may be contractor furnished equipment (CFE), and repeaters
and associated networks may be government furnished equipment (GFE).
5 FAH-2 H-732.7 Operational Testing
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(Uniform all agencies)
a. E&E/EAC radio
systems must be tested monthly, or more
frequently, as directed by the Chief of Mission to ensure the
operational readiness of equipment and the proficiency
of system users. Anyone who might
use the networks in an emergency, including spouses and children, should
participate in these tests. The information
management officer (IMO), in coordination with the posts executive office,
shall establish firm commitments from all users to ensure active participation
in the testing upon issuance of the hand-held radio.
b. Posts EAC must
establish procedures for the monthly radio
tests on the EAC and E&E networks. The test results
must be made available to the management officer (MO), deputy chief of mission (DCM),
regional security officer (RSO), and information programs officer
(IPO). If needed, the Regional
Information Management Center (RIMC) may be
included.
c. Administrative
networks should be tested monthly. The IMO should coordinate with the management
section to conduct radio tests. Test results should be forwarded to the IMO,
MO, and if needed the RIMC.
5 FAH-2 H-732.8 Radio User Training
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(Uniform all agencies)
Information management
personnel at post will provide familiarization training to all participants on
how to use the E&E, EAC, and ADM radio equipment assigned to them. The LGF
familiarization training for hand-held radios, base stations, and mobile patrol
radios is the responsibility of the RSO/PSO. IRM personnel may assist the
RSO/PSO with guidance and training on these types of equipment.
5 FAH-2 H-733 Radio Encryption
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(State)
IRMs Radio Programs
Branch (IRM/FO/ITI/LWS/RPB) provides Advance Encryption Standard (AES) radios for Emergency Action Committee networks. These
encryption algorithms provide limited protection from unauthorized interception
of voice communications. AES is approved
for transmissions up to and including Sensitive
But Unclassified (SBU). Under no circumstances should AES-equipped radios be
used for the transmission of classified information, as defined by Executive
Order 13526.
5 FAH-2 H-733.1 Controlling and
Safeguarding Radios
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(State)
a. The classification of AES radio equipment, whether
loaded with active AES key codes or not, is sensitive but unclassified (SBU). Locally
Employed Staff (LE Staff), or Third-Country Nationals (TCNs) must not be
permanently issued portable (hand-held) radios equipped
with AES encryption. Locally Employed Staff (LES), or Third-Country Nationals
(TCNs) may be granted limited use of
AES-equipped radios, if approved in writing by the mission's IMO. However,
foreign national access and use of AES radios must be limited to an immediate
operational requirement. When foreign nationals are granted access to AES
radio equipment, all cleared AES radio users must be notified that foreign
nationals have been granted access to the encrypted system.
b. The installation of the AES radios must be limited
to vehicles assigned to the Chief of Mission, Marine security guards, Regional
Security Office, and those vehicles specifically identified in the missions
Emergency Action Plan (EAP) for evacuation use (See
12 FAH-1 Appendix 7).
c. Spare encryption
capable radios must be zeroized and stored in secure locations
accessible to Information Programs Center
(IPC) personnel including the local
radio/telephone technician. If not equipped
with a zeroize feature, a randomly produced key
code must be loaded in order to overwrite the
mission's actual operational code prior to
storage by local staff. To ensure the integrity
of encrypted conversations, all personnel issued an encryption capable radio
must maintain proper accountability at all times. In the event a radio cannot
be accounted for, the IMO and/or IPO must initiate an encryption key change.
d. All radios must have
an associated asset record created in the Department's property system of
record - the Integrated Logistics Management System (ILMS) Asset Management
(AM) module (see 14 FAM 414.1-2). All loaned and/or issued radios must be inventoried
during the Departments annual physical inventory utilizing the ILMS-AM module.
Each issue transaction must be documented on a form DS-584 Nonexpendable Property Transaction.
e. Domestic and overseas
IMO staff, property supervisors and property managers must utilize the ILMS-loanable
property (LP) module to loan and/or issue radios to individuals, sections, or
agencies (see 14 FAH-1
H-424.3). The ILMS-LP module is configurable
to allow overseas locally employed (LE) staff to have limited access and visibility
to asset record information in order to loan and/or issue radios (5 FAH-2
H-733.5). Personnel should request access
via the ILMS user access request form. See the ILMS-LP online tutorials for
step-by-step instructions on how to use this module in addition to contacting
your A/LM/PMP/PM property management desk officer for assistance.
5 FAH-2 H-733.2 Maintenance
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(State)
a. Maintenance of AES-equipped radios must only be
performed by information management technical specialist (IMTS), information management
specialist (IMS), or contractors that specialize
in radio communications.
b. Foreign nationals may install and remove vehicle and
fixed AES equipment. These radios must be
zeroized or have a randomly produced key code loaded by the IMO and/or IPO
prior to foreign nationals installation or removal.
c. When
maintenance requirements of AES radio equipment exceeds the capabilities of
post IMSs, equipment must be shipped via classified pouch to the Regional
Information Management Center (RIMC) or IRMs Radio Program Branch for
servicing.
d. All AES radio
equipment in storage or maintenance must be zeroized of all key codes. If not
equipped with a zeroize feature, a randomly produced key code must be loaded in
order to overwrite the mission's actual operational code.
5 FAH-2 H-733.3 Key Loaders
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(State)
a. All AES encryption key
loaders must be controlled by the information programs officer (IPO) and
stored in the mission's Information Programs Center (IPC).
b. AES key loading equipment and key codes for radio systems operating at the SBU level fall under
NIST regulations (NIST SP 800-53, SP 800-57, FIPS-197) and are not COMSEC
accountable items.
5 FAH-2 H-733.4 Compromise and Loss
of AES Equipment
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(State)
The integrity of AES encryption keys and equipment is
critical to ensuring that radio communication is protected.
Any AES equipped radio, keying equipment,
or key codes that are lost, stolen, seized, captured, or otherwise compromised,
must be reported immediately to the IMO/IPO
and RSO.
5 FAH-2 H-733.5 Emergency
Destruction
(CT:TEL-60; 07-26-2017)
(State)
a. The mission's IMO and
RSO must determine the appropriate course of action, based on local conditions,
to protect the integrity of the Department's AES equipment. For situations that require
the abandonment of AES radio assets, actions
should be taken to ensure that the AES equipment is destroyed. In a nonemergency situation, the
equipment must be sent via classified pouch to the missions designated safe
haven for secure storage. AES equipment should
be included in the list of holdings section on the facility specific information
as part of the destruction of sensitive materials response plan in the EAP
(See 12 FAH-1 Annex E 4.2).
b. In the event the mission should execute its COMSEC
Emergency Destruction Plan (see 5 FAH-6 on ClassNet), all AES radio equipment
must be collected, zeroized, and secured in the mission's IPC after its use is
no longer practical. AES-equipped radios that must be abandoned with vehicles
must be destroyed using an appropriate destruction device (e.g., a sledge
hammer) if removal of the equipment is not possible. AES equipment must never
be abandoned, keyed and in working
condition, if the potential of theft or capture is likely.
5 FAH-2 H-734 THROUGH H-739 UNASSIGNED