SECRETARY RICE: Well, they clearly need to move forward on the issues which are really major issues of reconciliation. Now to be fair to them, this government is just a little over a year old. This is a society that has been dominated by dictatorship and by violent resolution of conflict for most of its history. And you're now asking people to make political compromises and political deals in a way that is going to define, really for now, generations, the relationship between these groups. And that's hard.

When I look at the difficulties that we had in creation of our own republic or even if I look at the difficulties that we have in our legislature of coming to terms on fundamental issues like immigration reform, for instance, in the United States in a mature democracy, I think we're asking them or they're asking themselves to define major issues like how will the resources of the country be shared among groups, issues like how you will deal with the past of de-Baathification, how will you integrate Sunnis into a structure when they essentially boycotted the boat at the time of the elections.

So, they're really, really hard issues and sometimes, we tend to forget that when we say, "Well, why can't they solve them?" That said, they have to solve them, because they are -- this kind of de jure recognition -- reconciliation, I think, is at the core of beginning to really put together a unified Iraqi state that can function. Now I say de jure recognition quite deliberately because the kind of normative reconciliation that we all hope they will come to may take decades. I very often think back to my own experience in Birmingham when, in 1964 and 1965, you had a series of laws that gave de jure desegregation and mixing of the races. It wasn't as if on the day after the Public Accommodations Act passed, everybody thought that mixing of the races was a great idea. But over a long period of time, people respond to those laws, they get accustomed to those laws; they begin to behave on the basis of those laws. And over time, you get normative reconciliation.

So I would draw a distinction between what they're trying to do now, which is to pass laws, get constitutional reform, that would give a de jure basis for the groups to act together. But the building, really, of a kind of normative relationship between the groups may take a very long time. I think our responsibility is to give them a period of time, a breathing space, if you will, to get the de jure reconciliation in place and that's what they've got to do.

QUESTION: But the problem remains that in terms of their pace of development, that to some extent (inaudible) consistent with the political (inaudible) that exists in this country for us to be present there and provide them with that space. And then in one sense, when we were evolving as a country, we weren't dependent on a foreign military presence to maintain whatever semblance of law and order exists. And it's clear that not only in the Democratic Party, but in the Republican Party, whatever may be the consequences, which I think are horrific if we leave, the political calculations are going to make it much more difficult for us to stay there in support of that political space for them.

So they do have a time pressure, it seems to me, that is independent of what's happening internally and they frankly do not have particularly good leadership to accomplish all of this, at least by the standards of performance to date. So how do you anticipate that we can somehow run and get them to move? Because now, the political standard is, "Well, we'll tell them we're going to leave or we are going to leave and maybe that will get them to move." And seems to me to be a -- you know, blowing up the grenade against yourself.

SECRETARY RICE: No, I think that's a very good analysis. I mean, the fact is that we, for our own security interests, need Iraq to succeed, to say, "We will withdraw the support so that they can succeed, because it's taking them a long time to do it," really is the kind of equivalent of saying, "Well, you know, you're not doing something I want, so I'll shoot myself." It doesn't really hold, but I do understand and I think everybody has made clear to them that there -- our patience is not endless and I mean not just the patience of the American people, the patience of the Administration, because the fact is they have both our own situation in which we need to be able to sustain, to support. But frankly, they need to be able to sustain the support of the Iraqi people too. The Iraqi leadership, I do believe, recognizes that the Iraqi people are waiting for their democratically elected government to begin to deliver certain benefits to them, particularly benefits of security and that that's not going to happen in the absence of reconciliation. And so they do have pressures from all sides.

Now I have spent a good deal of time, as you might imagine, with various leaders there and when I talk to Ryan Crocker, what we're trying to focus on is what things can they do to give some confidence to all constituencies that in fact, they're moving forward. And I think the most likely -- the oil law which is always just on the verge of being done, but now but now really needs to get done. And the other, which is going somewhat better -- you know, last year, they had a lot of trouble getting budget resources actually spent on behalf of the provinces. And in talking to people, they are now developing projects. They are beginning to get resources out to the provinces and that's also important, is that they're building leadership from the bottom up, but they're hard issues. But they don't have the luxury, really, of time.

QUESTION: Has Ambassador Crocker's meeting with his Iranian counterparts brought any tangible results?

SECRETARY RICE: Oh, I don't think that I would make that judgment at this point. And frankly, I think it may be awhile before -- the point that Ryan was making, which is that this is not about bestowing benefits upon the United States; this is about if, in fact, the Iranians have the interests that they say they have, they're undermining them in the way that they are behaving. They say that they would want a unified Iraq that is stable, that they want this Shia-led government to succeed, and their policies are undermining exactly that outcome.

So I don't know if and when there will be another meeting. The Iraqis would like another meeting to take place. I think we're looking at that. But I don't think one encounter is probably going to get that point across to the Iranians.

QUESTION: Just to be clear, what are the policies you're talking about that Iran is engaged in?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, if you are arming militias, as we believe they are doing, that are therefore undermining then the concept of a unified security force for the Iraqis, if you are, at the very least, transporting technologies that are lethal to coalition forces when the Iraqis would be the first to admit that they need coalition forces until their own security forces can (inaudible) and if you are preventing a secure Iraq from emerging, really undermining the discipline of the rest of the neighbors not to get involved in Iraq in an unhelpful way, you're not helping to create a stable Iraq.

QUESTION: Well, back in the time that the surge was being designed, there was a lot of debate over whether the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi army lacked the will or the capability. Here we are now, six months later, and I know the surge is not complete, but where do you stand? Is it the lack of will or how much of it is a lack of will versus capability?

SECRETARY RICE: I think on the security front, they are showing significant will and some capability. I wouldn't try to make a judgment on -- if I'm not on the ground, and I think we have to wait and see what the assessment would be overall, but they are in the fight with us. They are producing forces; some of that through central security forces, some of that in places like Al-Anbar where they've gone up and put their sons into training to be police, so I think they're producing people who are a part of the fight. I think the capability is still emerging, but I don't think that you can say that the security forces are showing a lack of will at this point.

QUESTION: They're not?

SECRETARY RICE: I think they're showing -- I do not think they're showing a lack of will. And the one indicator that we follow most closely, which is, have there been efforts against both Sunni and Shia outlaws; I think on that, the record's pretty good. Because the problem before had been a sense that the security forces were very sectarian. There are still strong sectarian tendencies, particularly in the police, but the leadership has shown a willingness -- a leadership of the security forces to go after people after both.

QUESTION: In his testimony yesterday, General Lute, I think, used the word "erratic" to describe the Iraqi army's performance.

SECRETARY RICE: Yeah, I would say -- I would probably use the word variable (Laughter).

QUESTION: Now we know where you stand.

SECRETARY RICE: (Laughter.) No, really, there are some that are performing really well, some that are performing okay, and some that are performing not well at all. And I think that there are times when the ones who are performing well don't perform well. But it's a new security force and to a certain extent, if you were to go out and look at any security force in the world, would you be able to say that they perform well 100 percent of the time? Probably not. If you're looking at a very new security force, they perform perhaps less well more of the time than they perform well. But I think it's the ups and downs of dealing with a security force in training.

The point that I'm making is that when you -- when we asked about the question of will, it wasn't or they willing to fight, it was the question of are they willing to fight in an even-handed fashion, because that was the problem in the past and what gave the Sunnis reason to believe that they were being left out of the equation. I think people would now say that they are fighting on both sides of the divide.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary --

QUESTION: But even the word -- the word, sectarian, somehow or other, is sort of -- is sort of (inaudible). What you have is an explosion of some kind of radicalism motivated by religion in the entire region. You see it with Hamas. You see it with (inaudible). It's stimulated by Iran, not just by Iraq, and that is something that (inaudible) somehow or another, like some -- almost an epidemic and nobody quite knows how to deal with that. What are your thoughts in terms of how America engages in that part of the world when small groups of that community can really just dominate all of the politics in that entire region?

SECRETARY RICE: I think, Mort, that when we are able to do real kind of historic forensics on this, which may be awhile, we will learn that this was all underneath the surface in the Middle East.

QUESTION: In earlier years?

SECRETARY RICE: In earlier years; that it exploded periodically in its most virulent form through al-Qaeda when they managed an attack. It exploded from time to time through Hamas or Hezbollah, but it was there. And the absence of legitimate political channels for moderates to act meant that the politics, if you will, was going on, but it was going on in the most radical elements and maybe even in the most radical context, like very radical mosques in the Middle East. For a variety of reasons, some having to do with Iraq and the defeat of Saddam Hussein and the need to contest the politics in a more open way, I think you have begun to see that these elements are contesting in a way that they know, which is violence.

Now the answer to that is that you have to press to make the contestation of politics about politics, not about violence. And that's why what's happening in Lebanon with the Siniora government is so important. It's why what's happening in Iraq with the Maliki government is so important, because I don't believe that most Iraqis or most Lebanese want to contest their politics violently.

And that brings me a little bit to the Palestinian territories. Somehow, you've got to find a way for moderate forces in the Palestinian territories to also contest the politics through politics, not through violence. And we can talk later, I'm sure, about how that might be, but at least in these places now, there is an arena in which this can take place through politics. There are -- it's going to be under pressure for awhile from these extremists across the board. But it's ever more the reason that the involvement of the United States, whether it's through our military forces on the ground in Afghanistan or Iraq or through our political engagement with Lebanon or the Palestinians, it's so critical to use American power and influence to hold off the extremists while the political institutions have a chance to mature.

QUESTION: The attempted seizure of the Great Mosque in 1979 was a turning point for the Saudi Government. They began to empower and fund the ministry of religion to a degree that has been unprecedented ever since. In fact, that is often attributed as one of the main factors in the explosion of the religious intensity of that community. Does the Saudi Government have any second thoughts about that? Do we have any kind of dialogue with them about that that can have any meaning?

SECRETARY RICE: We do have a dialogue about it with them. And first of all, I think they recognized that the first key was, was there a terrorism problem inside the kingdom, and it became quite obvious that there was and I think they're fighting back against that.

The second question is kind of what's the source of that and what is the effect on the rest of the region. And we've had a lot of discussions about -- and King Abdullah has been in the lead of drawing religious leaders together to have a more moderate course for what the Saudi religious community is preaching, is exporting abroad, and so forth. I think that's a work in progress. But yeah -- and it wasn't just Saudi, by the way. I mean, I think that this has been -- it may have had some origins there, but I think it wasn't just Saudi Arabia. I think this was something that was a kind of transnational movement of very radical forces.

QUESTION: But it's not simply religious moderates you're talking about. From your argument, you're also talking about the Muslim Blood Brotherhood in Egypt which is, you know, sort of an ancestor of al-Qaeda and you can sort of trace those lineages. But to the extent that there's no channel for a moderate political expression in Saudi Arabia or Egypt, aren't we sort of still perpetuating the problem?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, that's exactly the point of the President's democracy agenda; that it's both morally right and politically necessary that there be a set of institutions in which moderate voices that don't want to use force and want to settle their politics by politics can act. If you think about it, if you cut off a set of institutions in which people can overcome differences of religion or race or economic interest, then what choice do they have? They have the choice of going to the streets, so to speak. And that's exactly the point. And it's why when people who think that somehow, the democracy agenda is a flight of fantasy or fancy, you know, it's this sort of utopian notion, I think just don't get it.

I was saying last night, if you think that you can have interests out here and values over here, you can't explain what happened to us on September 11th; you can't explain it and you also can't respond to it. And so the democracy agenda is, as I said, both morally right and politically very necessary for exactly that reason.

QUESTION: Getting a look at the (inaudible), it seems to me in that -- if you have democracy and democratic elections in countries like Egypt and much of North Africa, you will end up with (inaudible) of power or Hamas carrying a lot of the power and that's where you get into a very different kind of problem.

SECRETARY RICE: Mort, I fully accept that there are downsides to elections in immature political systems where democratic institutions haven't quite taken hold yet. The problem is I can't figure any other way to get the democratic institutions. I think that the -- my father used to say if you're on the horns of a dilemma, choose one; don't try to hang on both simultaneously.

And here is the problem, if you don't begin the politics of contestation because you're afraid of who might contest, then you're never going to get there. So yes, there are some downsides to the fact that over this long period of time, probably the most organized forces have been radical forces, not moderate forces. But if you say, "Well, we're going to wait until moderate forces organize so that they can contest the politics," you will -- you'll never get moderate forces because authoritarian regimes, authoritarian politics will continue to squeeze out the development of moderates. So I fully admit you may go through some rather uncomfortable transition, but I could make an argument to you about what happened in the territories, for instance; that it has been very interesting to see Hamas trying to come to terms with no longer being, really a resistance movement, but having to deal with politics.

A moderate Palestinian friend of mine said, "You know, they used to be the great resistance, running the streets with their faces covered and going after Israel. And now, they look like a bunch of politicians who also can't make the sewer system work." And they're clearly uncomfortable in that framework, which is part of why I think you see the military wing of Hamas trying to make this again about Israel and the Palestinians, not about the contestation of politics inside the Palestinian territories. So I admit it's uncomfortable, but I think it's also necessary.

QUESTION: But given the facts on the ground there, I'm at a loss to understand the theory of your political horizon for the Palestinian people and how you intend to implement the --

SECRETARY RICE: Well, the notion of a political horizon is simply that you have to begin to sketch out a normal political framework for Palestinians to contest their politics. In the absence of a normal political framework --

QUESTION: Right.

SECRETARY RICE: -- a two-state solution, you will continue to get radicals with the only answer about how to deal with Palestinian politics. So -- and I think you saw an echo of it over the last couple of weeks. I have -- we have not recognized or supported the Palestinian unity government because until there is a Palestinian government that recognizes the Quartet principles, which I just call now the foundational principles for peace, you're not going to have a successful Palestinian state; it can't be.

But there are political forces in the Palestinian territories who already accept the Quartet principles. And you have to give them a process of developing those -- on the basis of those principles developing a destination point called the Palestinian state which they can point to and say, "That's where we're going; follow us, not them." So it is an effort to insert into this place a sense of what a normal political framework would be like. So in the absence of one you're not going to get that --

QUESTION: So how do you implement that?

SECRETARY RICE: Pardon me?

QUESTION: How do you implement that?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, the first thing that you do is you get the Israelis and the Palestinians, as they have begun to circle each other to do, to talk about what that relationship between a Palestinian state and an Israeli state is going to look like. And I know everybody jumps immediately to the question of borders in Jerusalem and so forth. I -- nobody expects Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas to walk into a room and say "Okay, so how about Jerusalem?" It doesn't make sense.

But to talk about what kind of security concept might work between them, what kind of economic relationship might work between them, you have to begin to get a conversation in which they gain confidence, both sides. You notice I didn't say confidence-building measures, I said in which they gain confidence, that there is something called a viable Palestinian state that is both viable for the Palestinians and a source of security, not risk, for the Israelis and that's a discussion. That's a conversation.

QUESTION: But does that mean that the United States puts forward its proposal for what boundaries are for Jerusalem's solutions are or is it just a process that you're conducting?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, we haven't proposed anything yet.

QUESTION: Not yet.

SECRETARY RICE: And you know, I -- we're going to have broad consultations over a period of time here before we would propose anything. But what we're saying is the United States can facilitate this discussion toward this normal political entity called the state. When it becomes the right time to start drawing its outlines, in other words, in what territory is it going to exist, what is going to be its capital, so forth and so on -- I don't think we're there yet.

But unless you start to establish -- but let me say re-establish because I think that part of what's happened over the last six years since the second antifada began, is that there's been an erosion of confidence that in fact, there is this Palestinian state that will be a source of normal politics for the Palestinians and security for the Israelis and so re-establishing that, I think, first is very good.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, back to Iraq for a second. Setting aside the issue of Iraqi security, which you've done, how do you assess the progress of the surge?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, I'm probably not the best person to do that at this point. I mean, I see the reports that everybody sees. I think that they have been effective at clearing some of the tough areas of Iraq, of -- in and around Baghdad. I read that the -- it's tough going and that's perhaps not surprising because the -- everybody knows that the bad guys are going to fight back when you start going after them.

I think the real goal has got to be see if once they've cleared, which I'm quite confident we will do -- our forces with the Iraqis will do, how we backfill with Iraqi security forces and economic reconstruction, which is why we've spent -- in my world at State and in the embassy, we spend so much time on budget execution with the Iraqis to make sure that projects can get funded so that people who clear these bad forces out of their regions can actually see progress. And that's sort of the next phase of this. But you know, the forces are pouring in, they're doing their work. I don't have any doubt that they'll succeed in clearing. I think it's the second phase of holding that's going to be decisive and we just haven't gotten there in a lot of places.

QUESTION: Do you think that there will be a huge withdraw in (inaudible) 2008?

SECRETARY RICE: I can't make that determination. I think that General Petraeus will come back and he'll -- he and Ryan will let us know what they think is going on. And we'll have to look at what the numbers look like at that time. But the other point that I would make is that probably, one of the most difficult things to deal with right now is that if you look at what we were really worried about around Baghdad, which were kind of sectarian murders, death squads going into a neighborhood, lining up the men, shooting the men, and sending the women into exile, I think there's been a lot of progress on that kind of thing.

Al-Qaeda has nonetheless stepped up -- al-Qaeda and its -- I can't claim to you that they're all al-Qaeda, but they've stepped up the kind of suicide bombing, spectacular attack which -- no matter how much progress you make on the former, which I think is really at the core of, can the fabric of Iraqi society hold together. No matter how much progress you make on that, the spectacular bombings are unnerving to Iraqis and to Americans, for that matter, and they clearly stepped up their activities in that regard.

QUESTION: On another topic, there was a report, I think, out of Europe today that the CIA had operated prisons in Poland and Romania and these two top-level al-Qaeda operatives had been held there. True; false?

SECRETARY RICE: We don't comment on our intelligence matters. And you know, when I was in Europe now several months ago, this story was out there. And what I've explained to people is that, you know, we can't comment on intelligence matters, but we've always respected our allies and their sovereignty in whatever we've done.

QUESTION: I have two questions on Iran. What's your view of how close Iran is to being able to make a nuclear weapon? And secondly, what -- are we making any progress on the United Nations with Russia and China?

SECRETARY RICE: Yeah. You could -- variable assessments of where Iran is. And I really think that trying to pin it down, at least when I think about it, I don't try to pin it down any longer. I assume that we need to work this as urgently as we can. But I also assume, and it was one reason that the ElBaradei comments, I think, were not helpful, frankly, you shouldn't assume that because they are building centrifuges or even because they've made some progress, that that means that they've now perfected that technology and therefore, we have to completely change course and allow them -- why bother to make them suspend and so forth and so on.

The process of enrichment and reprocessing is an engineering problem, once you learn to -- is an engineering problem, not a science problem, and so practicing is important. Learning to do it for long periods of time in which you can introduce nuclear material is important. Learning to do it over long cascades is important and so suspension still has tremendous benefit in stopping them short of learning how to use this technology.

I think at the UN, we've done relatively well at getting Security Council resolutions that, while modest -- and I would consider them modest in their literal impact -- have had much stronger impact than the words on the paper would tell you and there are a couple of reasons for that. The first is they've been unanimous which, by all accounts, was a surprise to the Iranians. They thought that the Russians would at least abstain, if not veto.

Secondly, they're Chapter 7 and the effect of Chapter 7 has put Iran into very bad company alongside Sudan and two countries that'll soon get out, I think the DROC and Liberia who were there for reasons that no longer attain, and the -- you know, the North Koreans. Now, when you're in that kind of company, people in the international community and in the international financial system look at you differently and so, the Iranians are experiencing that; that export credits are tougher to come by, people who will handle their assets are tougher to come by, people are making investment and are making decisions on the basis of investment and reputational risk. And by the way, if you're a financial institution, all you have is your reputation.

And the more Iran stays in this status, I think the harder they're going to find it to access what they need in the international financial system and that's going to have an effect -- that and the fact that Ahmadi-Nejad is pursuing disastrous economic policies, I think, is beginning to have an effect. So it's not just what's happening in the Security Council; it's the kind of collateral effects of what's happening in the Security Council.

QUESTION: Can you see Russia and China going the next step in tightening the screws further or is that all we're going to get?

SECRETARY RICE: No, I don't think it's all we're going to get. I don't know when. We've tried to keep two paths open. One is, keep down the Security Council and I think we'll start discussing now the next elements of another Security Council resolution. But at the same time, Javier Solana is trying to find a diplomatic solution, so I don't think he believes he's found one yet. But the Iranians know that, that path is open. The six have re-issued their proposal for a negotiated outcome and I think Javier will meet with them again in the next few -- the next week or so -- the next ten days or so.

QUESTION: Russia has become a very strange player for the last half dozen years -- I mean, where -- one has the sense that they want to take the opposite position to the United States, if only because it enhances their role as a major player. And the other thing, I assume it's because they want to use it as leverage (inaudible) leverage on what we are doing in the Ukraine in Georgia (inaudible). I mean, Lavrov has frankly always had a lot of hostility to the United States (inaudible). I can say that personally (inaudible). But I never thought Putin was like that (inaudible) and yet he seems to have moved in a lot of ways. How is that relationship now evolved?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, first of all, analytically, I think the Russians are trying to assert -- or are asserting what they see to be their interests and they do not feel -- when you talk to them, they do not feel that Russia asserted those interests in the '90s. So some of this is a view that they have to regain the attention of the international community that Russia will assert its interests and assert them aggressively.

In doing that, those assertions sometimes -- often bump up against us. But on not too few occasions bump up against the Europeans as well. Now, I think some of these are actual -- let me call them legitimate differences about some of my close-hold (inaudible) where I think they have a different historical view of Serbia, a different historical relationship to Serbia. What I've tried to say to them about Serbia is that's fine, but Serbia's future is with the European horizon and that means that asserting continued control over Kosovo, which they've already lost, doesn't make any sense from their point of view.

So there are arguments here, but I think some of it is not a matter of asserting against us. It's really that we have differences on certain things.

I would also say that there's an awful lot on which actually we have pretty strong cooperation: North Korea; proliferation in general; terrorism in general; nuclear issues in general; and on Iran, where I would say that they've moved pretty far with -- on the Iranians.

So it's mixed.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) engage in arms sales with Iran?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, let's remember that -- well, now it will not be possible to engage in arms trade. It's not going to be possible as this moves forward through the Security Council to engage in arms sales. They'll say that there are some legitimate defense interests that the Iranians have, and so forth and so on; and they're not the only ones who sell arms (inaudible).

QUESTION: How fondly would you like to see peaceful democratic change in Venezuela and why did you ask the OAS to investigate the shutdown of the television station network?

SECRETARY RICE: I asked the OAS to do that because the OAS has a Democratic Charter, Inter-American Democratic Charter. And it has an article, Article 18, that says that when there is a threat internally in a state, that there ought to be -- there can be the Secretary General to investigate it. So I think if -- you know, if you're not going to try to trigger it when the president of a South American country decides that a station can't be on the air because it criticizes him, I don't know when you would invoke it. So that was the reason for asking that it be invoked.

It's a consensus organization, so the Venezuelans said no. So that's maybe not all surprising either. But it's interesting that I think everybody else -- well, a lot -- not everybody -- lots of people in the OAS wanted it to happen.

Hugo Chavez is elected. But when you're elected, you should govern democratically. And less and less -- or let me put it differently. More and more, there are examples of anti-democratic government. Now, the RCTV situation has spiked it in ways that I think have made everybody stand up and take notice. I really -- when I was in Spain, for instance, this really got the attention of the Spanish. It's gotten the attention of the members of the OAS. It got the attention of the European parliament. So this has to remain -- it's going to remain in the hands of Venezuelans, as is right, but they need to have the view or they need to know that organizations like the Organization of American States that profess democratic values are going to stand up for them.

QUESTION: What about Sudan?

SECRETARY RICE: Well, the President imposed the unilateral sanctions on Sudan as a strong indication that the United States doesn't believe that the Sudanese Government is acting in good faith and that it needs to be held to account. We're working on a Security Council resolution. I can't tell you when it'll come to a vote. There's a lot of diplomatic activity that Ban Ki-moon is carrying out.

But the truth of the matter is that the regime is -- has just not done what it said it was going to do, which is to permit Addis Ababa, the agreement that Kofi Annan negotiated, the phasing of robust security forces in that can take care of this population. And I don't think that there is any evidence yet that they intend to carry through on those obligations.

Now, I would love to be proven wrong. I would love to have them do that. But we don't have a lot of time to waste. First of all, the humanitarian situation for a lot of people is getting worse. Secondly, the African Union forces that are there are under enormous pressure. The Rwandans, who are doing exceptional work in the toughest of circumstances, are not going to sit there and without a mandate to protect themselves and to protect the population. And third, the African Union force is too small and not mobile enough to be able to do what it needs to do.

So we have to-- I think we're going to have to press harder and we'll work on the Security Council resolution. And the U.S. sanctions I think were a strong sign that we don't intend to sit idly by while this happens.

QUESTION: You know, I heard this guy speak up at Columbia a couple years ago about Mauritania, who says primarily it's a race problem connected to slavery and a number of other things (inaudible). But he was just a little bit like (inaudible) and so the people in the room said well, why are we enslaving each other? He said: "I'm and Arab. I was raised as an Arab (inaudible)." And so I think that whenever the Sudanese (inaudible) speak for them who looks to the world more like someone who's (inaudible). Now, he could be like this guy from Mauritania (inaudible) but to the world at large you said, well, the guy (inaudible) comes out there. And I said, well, oh, well, this can't be (inaudible). (Laughter.)

You know what I mean? I mean, like (inaudible). (Laughter.)

SECRETARY RICE: Whatever.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

SECRETARY RICE: (Inaudible.) (Laughter.)

QUESTION: (Inaudible.) (Laughter.)

SECRETARY RICE: Yeah, yeah.

QUESTION: That's what happens when you bring up Sudan. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY RICE: Yes. No, but look -- but there is a point that I want to make (inaudible) that there are several conflicts going on here. Among them herders versus farmers, among them -- you know, there is an Arab part, African part of Sudan. It was part of the North-South problem as well. But basically, right now what you've got is a government that is for whatever complex reasons there are historically and so forth, is countenancing the slaughter of innocent people and the absence of humanitarian assistance for them.

And so I understand that there are a lot of complex issues here, but I think you just have to focus on the responsibility of the Khartoum government to do this. Now, to be fair, again, the rebels are not covering themselves in glory either. And you do have a need for the rebels to unite so that there can be a political solution to this.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, we know you've got to go. We really appreciate you coming.

SECRETARY RICE: Yes.

QUESTION: A quick follow-up on the Russians. Is the Azerbaijani radar station proposal a nonstarter? Why do you think (inaudible)?

SECRETARY RICE: I have to admit, I -- it sent me to try to do my geography on Azerbaijan. Look, I think what the presidents want to do -- and it's what we've been trying to do but maybe now that the two of them have talked about it. The Russians say, okay, maybe there is a threat, but we need to go back and talk about what the threat is. Don't tell us what the answer to the question is, let's go back and talk about the threat, and then maybe we can even talk about cooperative missile defense.

Fine, let's do that. But what was troubling about the period before this was the notion that somehow this was going to degrade the Russian nuclear arsenal. It made no sense. And that you were therefore going to have to attack targets in Europe because you had ten interceptors in Poland and radars in the Czech Republic? The rhetoric was just way outside of what was going on.

And that led some to be concerned that what was the aim here was actually to try to split the alliance. And I will tell you that the alliance has held together very well, partly because I think people know that we're making a reasonable effort, a concerted effort, to first of all demonstrate to the Russians that it's not aimed at them. When you send -- when Sergei Lavrov said, well, you know, we've had some general conversations, I had to say publicly, I'm sorry, when you send the Secretary of Defense, the head of the Missile Defense Agency, those aren't general conversations. Those are serious conversations.

Secondly, that we have tried to get them to see that this might be a good cooperative because -- cooperative arrangement because Iran, North Korea -- there are plenty of threats out there.

And finally, that the alliance isn't going to split because our security and that of the alliance is indivisible, and that they should not therefore start throwing around words like leaving CFE and I think you've seen some backing off of that.

So I think in the end it'll work out fine. Thank you.

QUESTION: Thank you very much.

SECRETARY RICE: Thank you. Thanks, everybody.

2007/T11-5